/*****************************************************************************

FD1094 encryption


The FD1094 is a custom CPU based on the 68000, which runs encrypted code.
The decryption key is stored in 8KB of battery-backed RAM; when the battery
dies, the CPU can no longer decrypt the program code and the game stops
working (though the CPU itself still works - it just uses a wrong decryption
key).

Being a 68000, the encryption works on 16-bit words. Only words fetched from
program space are decrypted; words fetched from data space are not affected.

The decryption can logically be split in two parts. The first part consists
of a series of conditional XORs and bitswaps, controlled by the decryption
key, which will be described in the next paragraph. The second part does a
couple more XORs which don't depend on the key, followed by the replacement
of several values with FFFF. This last step is done to prevent usage of any
PC-relative opcode, which would easily allow an intruder to dump decrypted
values from program space. The FFFF replacement may affect either ~300 values
or ~5000, depending on the decryption key.

The main part of the decryption can itself be subdivided in four consecutive
steps. The first one is executed only if bit 15 of the encrypted value is 1;
the second one only if bit 14 of the _current_ value is 1; the third one only
if bit 13 of the current value is 1; the fourth one is always executed. The
first three steps consist of a few conditional XORs and a final conditional
bitswap; the fourth one consists of a fixed XOR and a few conditional
bitswaps. There is, however, a special case: if bits 15, 14 and 13 of the
encrypted value are all 0, none of the above steps are executed, replaced by
a single fixed bitswap.

In the end, the decryption of a value at a given address is controlled by 32
boolean variables; 8 of them change at every address (repeating after 0x2000
words), and constitute the main key which is stored in the battery-backed
RAM; the other 24 don't change with the address, and depend solely on bytes
1, 2, and 3 of the battery-backed RAM, modified by the "state" which the CPU
is in.

The CPU can be in one of 256 possible states. The 8 bits of the state modify
the 24 bits of the global key in a fixed way, which isn't affected by the
battery-backed RAM.
On reset, the CPU goes in state 0x00. The state can then be modified by the
program, executing the instruction
CMPI.L  #$00xxFFFF, D0
where xx is the state.
When an interrupt happens, the CPU enters "irq mode", forcing a specific
state, which is stored in byte 0 of the battery-backed RAM. Irq mode can also
be selected by the program with the instruction
CMPI.L  #$0200FFFF, D0
When RTE is executed, the CPU leaves irq mode, restoring the previous state.
This can also be done by the program with the instruction
CMPI.L  #$0300FFFF, D0

Since bytes 0-3 of the battery-backed RAM are used to store the irq state and
the global key, they have a double use: this one, and the normal 8-bit key
that changes at every address. To prevent that double use, the CPU fetches
the 8-bit key from a different place when decrypting words 0-3, but this only
happens after wrapping around at least once; when decrypting the first four
words of memory, which correspond the the initial SP and initial PC vectors,
the 8-bit key is taken from bytes 0-3 of RAM. Instead, when fetching the
vectors, the global key is handled differently, to prevent double use of
those bytes. But this special handling of the global key doesn't apply to
normal operations: reading words 1-3 from program space results in bytes 1-3
of RAM being used both for the 8-bit key and for the 24-bit global key.



There is still uncertainty about the assignment of two global key bits.

key[1]
------
key_0b invert;  \ bits 7,5 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
global_xor0;    /
key_5b invert;  bit 6
key_2b invert;  bit 4
key_1b invert;  bit 3 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
global_xor1;    bit 2
key_0c invert;  bit 1
global_swap2;   bit 0

key[2]
------
key_1a invert;  bit 7 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
key_6b invert;  bit 6 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
global_swap0a;  bit 5
key_7a invert;  bit 4
key_4a invert;  bit 3
global_swap0b;  bit 2
key_6a invert;  bit 1
key_3a invert;  bit 0

key[3]
------
key_2a invert;  bit 7 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
global_swap3;   bit 6 always 1 for now (but 0 in a bad CPU)
key_5a_invert;  bit 5
global_swap1;   bit 4
key_3b invert;  bit 3
global_swap4;   bit 2
key_0a invert;  bit 1
key_4b invert;  bit 0


Analysis of the data contained in the 8k key data indicates some regularities.
To begin with, in all the keys seen so far, bit 7 ($80) in key values at
addresses $0004-$0FFF is always set to 1. Similarly, bit 6 ($40) in key values
at addresses $1000-$1FFF is always set to 1.

Even more interesting, however, is that analyzing the low 6 bits of the key
data reveals that a simple linear congruential generator has been used
consistently to generate the key bits. The LCG is of the form:

    temp = A * val;
    val' = temp + (temp << 16);

and it appears to be calculated to at least 22 bits. In all cases seen so far,
the value of 'A' is fixed at $29. To generate the low 6 bits of the key, the
result of the LCG is shifted right 16 bits and inverted.

The following pseudo-code will generate 7 of the 8 bits of the key data
successfully for all known keys, given the values of the 'shift' and 'B'
parameters, as well as an initial 'seed' for the generator:

void genkey(UINT32 seed, UINT8 *output)
{
    int bytenum;

    for (bytenum = 4; bytenum < 8192; bytenum++)
    {
        UINT8 byteval;

        seed = seed * 0x29;
        seed += seed << 16;

        byteval = (~seed >> 16) & 0x3f;
        byteval |= (bytenum < 0x1000) ? 0x80 : 0x40;

        output[bytenum] = byteval;
    }
}

This only leaves one bit per key value (and the global key) left to determine.
It is worth pointing out that this remaining bit is the same bit that controls
how many opcodes to blank to $FFFF: 0 means a smaller subset (~300), while 1
indicates a much larger subset (~5000). Looking at the correlations between
where the key has this bit set to 0, and the presence of opcodes that would
be blanked as a result, seems to imply that the key is generated based on the
plaintext. That is, this final bit is set to 1 by default (hence blanking
more aggressively), and cleared to 0 if any plaintext words affected by the
byte in question would be incorrectly blanked.


When the keys were generated, the LCG seed wasn't input directly. Instead,
another value was entered, which in most cases was derived from the current
date/time. The LCG seed is obtained from that value via a multiplication.
The current date/time was also used in most cases to select the three bytes of
the global key. Interestingly, the global key must be inverted and read in
decimal representation to see this, while the seed must be read in hexadecimal
representation.

For some reason, bit 3 of the first byte of the global key was always set to 1
regardless of the value input into the key generator program, so e.g. the
input "88 01 23" would become "80 01 23".

The very first byte of internal RAM, which indicates the IRQ state, doesn't
seem to follow the same procedure. The IRQ state was probably decided at an
earlier time, not during the final key generation.


summary:
--------

   +------------------------------------------------- 317- part #
   |       +----------------------------------------- IRQ state (hex)
   |       |     +----------------------------------- global key (inverted, dec)
   |       |     |        +-------------------------- main key seed (hex) (LCG seed = seed * 0x2F1E21)
   |       |     |        |        +----------------- game
   |       |     |        |        |      +---------- year
   |       |     |        |        |      |        +- inferred key generation date
   |       |     |        |        |      |        |
--------  -- --------  ------  -------- ----  --------------------------
0041      12 87 06 19  895963  bullet   1987  87/06/19 (atypical)
0045      34 97 02 39  384694  suprleag 1987  (atypical)
0049      F1 87 10 28  8932F7  shinobi2 1987  87/10/28 (atypical)
0050      F1 87 10 28  8932F7  shinobi1 1987  87/10/28 (atypical)
0053      00 00 00 00  020000  sonicbom 1987  atypical
0056      CD 80 01 23  032ABC  thndrbld 1987  88/01/23 (atypical)
0059                           aceattac 1988
0060      45 80 03 30  343210  aceattaa 1988  88/03/30 (atypical)
0065                           altbeaj1 1988
0068      20 80 06 10  880610  altbeaj3 1988  88/06/10
0070      59 80 08 06  880806  passshtj 1988  88/08/06
0074      47 80 08 06  880806  passshta 1988  88/08/06
0071      20 80 08 09  880809  passsht  1988  88/08/09
0079      98 80 09 05  880906  exctleag 1988  88/09/05-88/09/06 (atypical)
0080      96 80 08 26  880826  passsht  1988  88/08/26
0058-02C  FF 80 10 07  881007  sspirtfc 1988  88/10/07
0084      0E 80 10 31  881031  wb31     1988  88/10/31
0085      26 80 11 08  881108  wb32     1988  88/11/08
0087      69 80 11 08  881108  wb34     1988  88/11/08
0089      52 80 11 29  881129  wb33     1988  88/11/29
0058-03B  71 80 11 25  881125  ggroundj 1988  88/11/25
0058-03C  04 80 11 27  881127  gground  1988  88/11/27
0090      AB 80 01 27  247333  wrestwa1 1989  atypical
0091      68 80 11 27  881127  tetris1  1988  88/11/27
0092      10 80 11 28  881128  tetris2  1988  88/11/28
0093      25 80 11 29  881129  tetris   1988  88/11/29
0093A     35 02 09 17  900209  tetris3  1988  90/02/09
0096      21 80 11 21  881121  ddux     1988  88/11/21
0102      AB 80 02 03  04588A  wrestwa2 1989  atypical
0058-04B  27 03 27 14  032714  crkdownj 1989  89/03/27 14:xx
0058-04C  19 03 27 05  032705  crkdown  1989  89/03/27 05:xx
0058-04D  DC 03 27 06  032706  crkdownu 1989  89/03/27 06:xx
0110      19 81 03 29  032916  goldnax1 1989  89/03/29 16:xx
0115      12 04 05 11  040511  bayroutj 1989  89/04/05 11:xx
0116      11 03 30 09  033009  bayroute 1989  89/03/30 09:xx
0118      22 81 03 07  030719  toutrun  1989  89/03/07 19:xx
toutrun2  22 81 03 07  031113  toutrun2 1989  89/03/11 13:xx (atypical)
0120      0D 81 03 29  032916  goldnax3 1989  89/03/29 16:xx
0121      35 81 03 29  032916  goldnaxj 1989  89/03/29 16:xx
0122      03 81 04 04  890404  goldnaxu 1989  89/04/04
0058-05B  92 81 06 09  890609  sgmastj  1989  89/06/09
0058-05C  30 81 06 13  890613  sgmastc  1989  89/06/13
0058-05D                       sgmast   1989
0124A     80 06 21 11  890621  smgpj    1989  89/06/21 11:xx
0125A     DE 06 15 16  890615  smgpu    1989  89/06/15 16:xx
0126      54 05 28 01  890528  smgp5    1989  89/05/28 01:xx
0126A     74 06 16 15  890616  smgp     1989  89/06/16 15:xx
0127A     5F 81 07 06  890706  fpoint   1989  89/07/06
0128      55 00 28 20  890828  eswatj   1989  89/08/28 20:xx
0129      0A 00 28 20  890828  eswatu   1989  89/08/28 20:xx
0130      EC 00 28 19  890828  eswat    1989  89/08/28 19:xx
0134      DE 81 11 30  891130  loffirej 1989  89/11/30
0135      98 81 11 31  891131  loffireu 1989  89/11/31
0136      12 81 11 29  891129  loffire  1989  89/11/29
0139      49 03 25 15  891125  bloxeed  1990  89/11/25 15:xx
0142      91 01 24 17  900124  mvpj     1989  90/01/24 17:xx
0143      20 02 02 18  900202  mvp      1989  90/02/02 18:xx
0144      2E 02 23 18  022318  rachero  1989  90/02/23 18:xx
0058-06B  88 03 15 09  900315  roughrac 1990  90/03/15 09:xx
0146      10 04 26 17  900426  astormj  1990  90/04/26 17:xx
0147      2D 04 14 14  900414  astormu  1990  90/04/14 14:xx
0148      50 04 26 15  900426  astorm3  1990  90/04/26 15:xx
0153      FC 04 10 14  900410  pontoon  1990  90/04/10 14:xx
0157      20 07 20 10  900720  mwalkj   1990  90/07/20 10:xx
0158      DE 07 15 15  900715  mwalku   1990  90/07/15 15:xx
0159      39 07 20 10  900720  mwalk    1990  90/07/20 10:xx
0162      8F 01 14 15  900914  gprider1 1990  90/09/14 15:xx
0163      99 01 13 15  900913  gprider  1990  90/09/13 15:xx
5023      EF 04 18 05  900917  ryukyu   1990  90/09/17 12:18? (atypical)
0165      56 82 11 25  901125  lghostu  1990  90/11/25
0166      A2 82 11 24  901124  lghost   1990  90/11/24
0169B     48 06 35 32  901205  abcop    1990  90/12/05 14:35? (atypical)
0058-08B  4E 04 17 15  910206  qsww     1991  91/02/06 12:17? (atypical)
0175      91 83 03 22  910322  cltchtrj 1991  91/03/22
0176      FC 83 03 14  910314  cltchitr 1991  91/03/14
0179A     73 06 55 17  910318  cottonj  1991  91/03/18 14:55? (atypical)
0180      73 03 53 00  910403  cottonu  1991  91/04/03 11:53? (atypical)
0181A     73 06 55 17  910318  cotton   1991  91/03/18 14:55? (atypical)
0058-09D  91 83 06 26  910618  dcclubfd 1991  91/06/18-91/06/26 (atypical)
0182      07 07 12 14  921401  ddcrewj  1991  92/07/12 14:01? (atypical)
0184      07 07 12 16  921622  ddcrew2  1991  92/07/12 16:22? (atypical)
0186      5F 83 07 01  912030  ddcrewu  1991  92/07/01 20:30? (atypical)
0190      07 07 17 16  921716  ddcrew   1991  92/07/17 17:16? (atypical)
ddcrew1   91 84 07 42  910744  ddcrew1  1991  92/07/xx 07:44? (atypical)
0196      4A 20 12 22  920623  desertbr 1992  92/06/23 20:12? (atypical)
0197A     3F 84 06 19  920612  wwallyja 1992  92/06/12-92/06/19 (atypical)
0197B     3F 84 06 19  920612  wwallyj  1992  92/06/12-92/06/19 (atypical)

----

Bad CPUs that gave some more information about the global key:

          global01 global02 global03
          -------- -------- --------
          .....    ..       ..
unknown   11111111 11110110 10111110  (Shinobi 16A, part no. unreadable, could be dead)
unknown   10101011 11111000 11010101  (unknown ddcrewa key)
dead      00001111 00001111 00001111  (Alien Storm CPU with no battery)
bad       11100000 10101011 10111001  (flaky 317-0049)

----

Notes:

We start in state 0.
Vectors are fetched:
   SP.HI @ $000000 -> mainkey = key[0], globalkey = { $00, $00, $00 }, less aggressive blanking
   SP.LO @ $000002 -> mainkey = key[1], globalkey = { $00, $00, $00 }, less aggressive blanking
   PC.HI @ $000004 -> mainkey = key[2], globalkey = { key[1], $00, $00 }
   PC.LO @ $000006 -> mainkey = key[3], globalkey = { key[1], key[2], $00 }

driver    FD1094    SP plain  SP enc    PC plain  PC enc    States Used
--------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  -----------
aceattaa  317-0060  00000000  A711AF59  00000400  AF59EADD  00 17 31 45 90 FC
altbeaj3  317-0068  FFFFFF00  B2F7F299  00000400  CCDDEF58  00 0F 18 20 93 A7 D8
altbeaj1  317-0065            C9C5F299            CCDDECDD
bayroute  317-0116  00504000  5EB40000  00001000  5533A184  00 04 11 18
bayroutj  317-0115  00504000  56150000  00001000  85948DCF  00 05 12 16
bullet    317-0041  00000000  57355D96  00001882  8DDC8CF4         (deduced, not 100% sure)
cotton    317-0181a 00204000  5DB20000  00000716  CCDD0716  00 0E 73
cottonu   317-0180  00204000  5DB20000  00000716  A1840716  00 0E 73
cottonj   317-0179a 00204000  5DB20000  00000716  CCDD0716  00 0E 73
ddux      317-0096  00000000  5F94AF59  00000406  AF5987A0  00 21 28 70 D9
eswat     317-0130  00000000  A711AF59  00000400  5533BC59  00 05 0C EC FA
eswatu    317-0129  00000000  5537AF59  00000400  55334735  00 0A 12 C3 CC
eswatj    317-0128  00000000  A711AF59  00000400  55334735  00 63 CB D5
exctleag  317-0079? 00000000  5537AF59  00000410  83018384         (deduced, not 100% sure)
fpoint    317-0127A 00000000  AF59AF59  00001A40  8DDC9960  00 15 35 5F 82 DB
fpoint1   317-0127A 00000000  AF59AF59  00001A40  8DDC9960  00 15 35 5F 82 DB
goldnaxu  317-0122  FFFFFF00  E53AF2B9  00000400  A184A196  00 03 51 72 99 F6
goldnaxj  317-0121  FFFFFF00  C9D6F2B9  00000400  AF59A785  00 12 35 58 7A 9E
goldnax3  317-0120  FFFFFF00  ED62F2B9  00000400  AF59A785  00 0A 0D 44 C7 EF
goldnax1  317-0110  FFFFFF00  ED62F2B9  00000400  AF59A785  00 19 2E 31 48 5D
mvp       317-0143  00000000  5F94A711  00000416  BD59DC5B  00 19 20 88 98
mvpj      317-0142  00000000  5F94AF59  00000416  BD599C7D  00 19 35 91 DA
passsht   317-0080  00000000  AF59AF59  00003202  C2003923  00 11 52 96 EE
passshta  317-0074  00000000  AF59AF59  000031E4  C2003F8C  00 12 47 83 A7
passshtj  317-0070  00000000  5D92AF59  000031E4  C2003F8C  00 12 59 83 FE
ryukyu    317-5023  00203800  AF49D30B  0000042E  FC5863B5  00 DC EF
shinobi2  317-0049  FFFFFF00  C9C5F25F  00000400  AF598395  00 53 88 9B 9C F1
sonicbom  317-0053  00000000  5735AF59  00001000  FC587133  00
suprleag  317-0045? 00000000  A711AF59            BD59CE5B
tetris2   317-0092  00000000  5735AF59  00000410  AF598685  00 10 52 74 97 FC
tetris1   317-0091  00000000  5D92AF59  00000410  AF59AE58  99 25 42 5B 68 FC
wb34      317-0087  FFFFFF7E  B2978997  00000500  AF590500  00 11 64 69 82
wb33      317-0089  FFFFFF7E  E5C78997  00000500  AF590500  00 23 40 52 71
wb32      317-0085  FFFFFF7E  B2F78997  00000500  AF590500  00 10 13 26 77
wrestwa2  317-0102  00000000  5D96AF59  00000414  EE588E5B  00 12 A7 AB CC F9 FC
wrestwa1  317-0090  00000000  5D96AF59  00000414  8301AE18  00 12 A7 AB CC F9 FC

suprleag pc possibilities:
  101E -> follows an RTS
  108E -> follows 3 NOPs
  11C4
  11C8
  1212
  1214
  1218
  1282
  1284
  1288
  1342
  1416
  141C
  1486
  148C
  1606
  1E52
  1E54

bullet pc possibilities:
  0822
  0824
  0882
  0884
  0C08
  137C
  1822
  1824
  1882
  1884
  1C08

tetris1:
  410: 4ff9 0000 0000  lea $0.l, a7
  416: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  41a: 0c80 005b ffff  cmpi.l #$5bffff, d0

  400: 4e71            nop
  402: 4e73            rte

tetris2:
  410: 4ff9 0000 0000  lea $0.l, a7
  416: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  41a: 0c80 0052 ffff  cmpi.l #$52ffff, d0

  400: 4e71            nop
  402: 4e73            rte

wrestwa1:
  414: 4ff8 0000       lea $0.w, a7
  418: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  41c: 0c80 00fc ffff  cmpi.l #$fcffff, d0

mvp:
  416: 4ff8 0000       lea $0.w, a7
  41a: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  41e: 7000            moveq #0, d0
  420: 2200            move.l d0, d1
  ...
  42c: 2e00            move.l d0, d7
  42e: 2040            movea.l d0, a0
  ...
  43a: 2c40            movea.l d0, a6
  43c: 0c80 0098 ffff  cmpi.l #$98ffff, d0

wb34:
  500: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  504: 0c80 0064 ffff  cmpi.l #$64ffff, d0

goldnaxu:
  400: 6000 000c       bra $40e
  40e: 4ff8 ff00       lea $ff00.w, a7
  412: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  416: 0c80 0072 ffff  cmpi.l #$72ffff, d0

ryukyu:
  42e: 4e71            nop
  ...
  440: 0c80 00dc ffff  cmpi.l #$dcffff, d0

eswat:
  400: 4ff8 0000       lea $0.w, a7
  404: 46fc 2700       move #$2700, sr
  408: 0c80 000c ffff  cmpi.l #$cffff, d0

*****************************************************************************/

#include "driver.h"
#include "fd1094.h"


/*
317-0162 CPU also needs to mask:
0x107a,
0x127a,
0x147a,
0x167a,
0x187a,
0x1a7a,
0x1c7a,
0x1e7a,
this only happens with 317-0162 so far; I assume it is a fault in the CPU.
*/
static const UINT16 masked_opcodes[] =
{
	0x013a,0x033a,0x053a,0x073a,0x083a,0x093a,0x0b3a,0x0d3a,0x0f3a,

	0x103a,       0x10ba,0x10fa,	0x113a,0x117a,0x11ba,0x11fa,
	0x123a,       0x12ba,0x12fa,	0x133a,0x137a,0x13ba,0x13fa,
	0x143a,       0x14ba,0x14fa,	0x153a,0x157a,0x15ba,
	0x163a,       0x16ba,0x16fa,	0x173a,0x177a,0x17ba,
	0x183a,       0x18ba,0x18fa,	0x193a,0x197a,0x19ba,
	0x1a3a,       0x1aba,0x1afa,	0x1b3a,0x1b7a,0x1bba,
	0x1c3a,       0x1cba,0x1cfa,	0x1d3a,0x1d7a,0x1dba,
	0x1e3a,       0x1eba,0x1efa,	0x1f3a,0x1f7a,0x1fba,

	0x203a,0x207a,0x20ba,0x20fa,	0x213a,0x217a,0x21ba,0x21fa,
	0x223a,0x227a,0x22ba,0x22fa,	0x233a,0x237a,0x23ba,0x23fa,
	0x243a,0x247a,0x24ba,0x24fa,	0x253a,0x257a,0x25ba,
	0x263a,0x267a,0x26ba,0x26fa,	0x273a,0x277a,0x27ba,
	0x283a,0x287a,0x28ba,0x28fa,	0x293a,0x297a,0x29ba,
	0x2a3a,0x2a7a,0x2aba,0x2afa,	0x2b3a,0x2b7a,0x2bba,
	0x2c3a,0x2c7a,0x2cba,0x2cfa,	0x2d3a,0x2d7a,0x2dba,
	0x2e3a,0x2e7a,0x2eba,0x2efa,	0x2f3a,0x2f7a,0x2fba,

	0x303a,0x307a,0x30ba,0x30fa,	0x313a,0x317a,0x31ba,0x31fa,
	0x323a,0x327a,0x32ba,0x32fa,	0x333a,0x337a,0x33ba,0x33fa,
	0x343a,0x347a,0x34ba,0x34fa,	0x353a,0x357a,0x35ba,
	0x363a,0x367a,0x36ba,0x36fa,	0x373a,0x377a,0x37ba,
	0x383a,0x387a,0x38ba,0x38fa,	0x393a,0x397a,0x39ba,
	0x3a3a,0x3a7a,0x3aba,0x3afa,	0x3b3a,0x3b7a,0x3bba,
	0x3c3a,0x3c7a,0x3cba,0x3cfa,	0x3d3a,0x3d7a,0x3dba,
	0x3e3a,0x3e7a,0x3eba,0x3efa,	0x3f3a,0x3f7a,0x3fba,

	0x41ba,0x43ba,0x44fa,0x45ba,0x46fa,0x47ba,0x49ba,0x4bba,0x4cba,0x4cfa,0x4dba,0x4fba,

	0x803a,0x807a,0x80ba,0x80fa,	0x81fa,
	0x823a,0x827a,0x82ba,0x82fa,	0x83fa,
	0x843a,0x847a,0x84ba,0x84fa,	0x85fa,
	0x863a,0x867a,0x86ba,0x86fa,	0x87fa,
	0x883a,0x887a,0x88ba,0x88fa,	0x89fa,
	0x8a3a,0x8a7a,0x8aba,0x8afa,	0x8bfa,
	0x8c3a,0x8c7a,0x8cba,0x8cfa,	0x8dfa,
	0x8e3a,0x8e7a,0x8eba,0x8efa,	0x8ffa,

	0x903a,0x907a,0x90ba,0x90fa,	0x91fa,
	0x923a,0x927a,0x92ba,0x92fa,	0x93fa,
	0x943a,0x947a,0x94ba,0x94fa,	0x95fa,
	0x963a,0x967a,0x96ba,0x96fa,	0x97fa,
	0x983a,0x987a,0x98ba,0x98fa,	0x99fa,
	0x9a3a,0x9a7a,0x9aba,0x9afa,	0x9bfa,
	0x9c3a,0x9c7a,0x9cba,0x9cfa,	0x9dfa,
	0x9e3a,0x9e7a,0x9eba,0x9efa,	0x9ffa,

	0xb03a,0xb07a,0xb0ba,0xb0fa,	0xb1fa,
	0xb23a,0xb27a,0xb2ba,0xb2fa,	0xb3fa,
	0xb43a,0xb47a,0xb4ba,0xb4fa,	0xb5fa,
	0xb63a,0xb67a,0xb6ba,0xb6fa,	0xb7fa,
	0xb83a,0xb87a,0xb8ba,0xb8fa,	0xb9fa,
	0xba3a,0xba7a,0xbaba,0xbafa,	0xbbfa,
	0xbc3a,0xbc7a,0xbcba,0xbcfa,	0xbdfa,
	0xbe3a,0xbe7a,0xbeba,0xbefa,	0xbffa,

	0xc03a,0xc07a,0xc0ba,0xc0fa,	0xc1fa,
	0xc23a,0xc27a,0xc2ba,0xc2fa,	0xc3fa,
	0xc43a,0xc47a,0xc4ba,0xc4fa,	0xc5fa,
	0xc63a,0xc67a,0xc6ba,0xc6fa,	0xc7fa,
	0xc83a,0xc87a,0xc8ba,0xc8fa,	0xc9fa,
	0xca3a,0xca7a,0xcaba,0xcafa,	0xcbfa,
	0xcc3a,0xcc7a,0xccba,0xccfa,	0xcdfa,
	0xce3a,0xce7a,0xceba,0xcefa,	0xcffa,

	0xd03a,0xd07a,0xd0ba,0xd0fa,	0xd1fa,
	0xd23a,0xd27a,0xd2ba,0xd2fa,	0xd3fa,
	0xd43a,0xd47a,0xd4ba,0xd4fa,	0xd5fa,
	0xd63a,0xd67a,0xd6ba,0xd6fa,	0xd7fa,
	0xd83a,0xd87a,0xd8ba,0xd8fa,	0xd9fa,
	0xda3a,0xda7a,0xdaba,0xdafa,	0xdbfa,
	0xdc3a,0xdc7a,0xdcba,0xdcfa,	0xddfa,
	0xde3a,0xde7a,0xdeba,0xdefa,	0xdffa
};

static UINT8 masked_opcodes_lookup[2][65536/8/2];
static UINT8 masked_opcodes_created = FALSE;

static int final_decrypt(int i,int moreffff)
{
	int j;

	/* final "obfuscation": invert bits 7 and 14 following a fixed pattern */
	int dec = i;
	if ((i & 0xf080) == 0x8000) dec ^= 0x0080;
	if ((i & 0xf080) == 0xc080) dec ^= 0x0080;
	if ((i & 0xb080) == 0x8000) dec ^= 0x4000;
	if ((i & 0xb100) == 0x0000) dec ^= 0x4000;

	/* mask out opcodes doing PC-relative addressing, replace them with FFFF */
	if (!masked_opcodes_created)
	{
		masked_opcodes_created = TRUE;
		for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_LENGTH(masked_opcodes); j++)
		{
			UINT16 opcode = masked_opcodes[j];
			masked_opcodes_lookup[0][opcode >> 4] |= 1 << ((opcode >> 1) & 7);
			masked_opcodes_lookup[1][opcode >> 4] |= 1 << ((opcode >> 1) & 7);
		}
		for (j = 0; j < 65536; j += 2)
		{
			if ((j & 0xff80) == 0x4e80 || (j & 0xf0f8) == 0x50c8 || (j & 0xf000) == 0x6000)
				masked_opcodes_lookup[1][j >> 4] |= 1 << ((j >> 1) & 7);
		}
	}

	if ((masked_opcodes_lookup[moreffff][dec >> 4] >> ((dec >> 1) & 7)) & 1)
		dec = -1;

	return dec;
}


/* note: address is the word offset (physical address / 2) */
static int decode(int address,int val,UINT8 *main_key,int gkey1,int gkey2,int gkey3,int vector_fetch)
{
	int mainkey,key_F,key_6a,key_7a,key_6b;
	int key_0a,key_0b,key_0c;
	int key_1a,key_1b,key_2a,key_2b,key_3a,key_3b,key_4a,key_4b,key_5a,key_5b;
	int global_xor0,global_xor1;
	int global_swap0a,global_swap1,global_swap2,global_swap3,global_swap4;
	int global_swap0b;


	/* for address xx0000-xx0006 (but only if >= 000008), use key xx2000-xx2006 */
	if ((address & 0x0ffc) == 0 && address >= 4)
		mainkey = main_key[(address & 0x1fff) | 0x1000];
	else
		mainkey = main_key[address & 0x1fff];

	if (address & 0x1000)	key_F = BIT(mainkey,7);
	else					key_F = BIT(mainkey,6);

	/* the CPU has been verified to produce different results when fetching opcodes
       from 0000-0006 than when fetching the inital SP and PC on reset. */
	if (vector_fetch)
	{
		if (address <= 3) gkey3 = 0x00;	// supposed to always be the case
		if (address <= 2) gkey2 = 0x00;
		if (address <= 1) gkey1 = 0x00;
		if (address <= 1) key_F = 0;
	}

	global_xor0         = 1^BIT(gkey1,5);
	global_xor1         = 1^BIT(gkey1,2);
	global_swap2        = 1^BIT(gkey1,0);

	global_swap0a       = 1^BIT(gkey2,5);
	global_swap0b       = 1^BIT(gkey2,2);

	global_swap3        = 1^BIT(gkey3,6);
	global_swap1        = 1^BIT(gkey3,4);
	global_swap4        = 1^BIT(gkey3,2);

	key_0a = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey3,1);
	key_0b = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey1,7);
	key_0c = BIT(mainkey,0) ^ BIT(gkey1,1);

	key_1a = BIT(mainkey,1) ^ BIT(gkey2,7);
	key_1b = BIT(mainkey,1) ^ BIT(gkey1,3);

	key_2a = BIT(mainkey,2) ^ BIT(gkey3,7);
	key_2b = BIT(mainkey,2) ^ BIT(gkey1,4);

	key_3a = BIT(mainkey,3) ^ BIT(gkey2,0);
	key_3b = BIT(mainkey,3) ^ BIT(gkey3,3);

	key_4a = BIT(mainkey,4) ^ BIT(gkey2,3);
	key_4b = BIT(mainkey,4) ^ BIT(gkey3,0);

	key_5a = BIT(mainkey,5) ^ BIT(gkey3,5);
	key_5b = BIT(mainkey,5) ^ BIT(gkey1,6);

	key_6a = BIT(mainkey,6) ^ BIT(gkey2,1);
	key_6b = BIT(mainkey,6) ^ BIT(gkey2,6);

	key_7a = BIT(mainkey,7) ^ BIT(gkey2,4);


	if ((val & 0xe000) == 0x0000)
		val = BITSWAP16(val, 12,15,14,13,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);
	else
	{
		if (val & 0x8000)
		{
			if (!global_xor1)	if (~val & 0x0008)	val ^= 0x2410;										// 13,10,4
								if (~val & 0x0004)	val ^= 0x0022;										// 5,1
			if (!key_1b)		if (~val & 0x1000)	val ^= 0x0848;										// 11,6,3
			if (!global_swap2)	if (!key_0c)		val ^= 0x4101;										// 14,8,0
			if (!key_2b)		val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13, 9,11,10,12, 8, 2, 6, 5, 4, 3, 7, 1, 0);	// 12,9,7,2

			val = 0x6561 ^ BITSWAP16(val, 15, 9,10,13, 3,12, 0,14, 6, 5, 2,11, 8, 1, 4, 7);
		}
		if (val & 0x4000)
		{
			if (!global_xor0)	if (val & 0x0800)	val ^= 0x9048;										// 15,12,6,3
			if (!key_3a)		if (val & 0x0004)	val ^= 0x0202;										// 9,1
			if (!key_6a)		if (val & 0x0400)	val ^= 0x0004;										// 2
			if (!key_5b)		if (!key_0b)		val ^= 0x08a1;										// 11,7,5,0
			if (!global_swap0b)	val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,10,12,11,13, 9, 4, 7, 6, 5, 8, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 13,10,8,4

			val = 0x3523 ^ BITSWAP16(val, 13,14, 7, 0, 8, 6, 4, 2, 1,15, 3,11,12,10, 5, 9);
		}
		if (val & 0x2000)
		{
			if (!key_4a)		if (val & 0x0100)	val ^= 0x4210;										// 14,9,4
			if (!key_1a)		if (val & 0x0040)	val ^= 0x0080;										// 7
			if (!key_7a)		if (val & 0x0001)	val ^= 0x110a;										// 12,8,3,1
			if (!key_4b)		if (!key_0a)		val ^= 0x0040;										// 6
			if (!global_swap0a)	if (!key_6b)		val ^= 0x0404;										// 10,2
			if (!key_5b)		val = BITSWAP16(val,  0,14,13,12,15,10, 9, 8, 7, 6,11, 4, 3, 2, 1, 5);	// 15,11,5,0

			val = 0x99a5 ^ BITSWAP16(val, 10, 2,13, 7, 8, 0, 3,14, 6,15, 1,11, 9, 4, 5,12);
		}

		val = 0x87ff ^ BITSWAP16(val,  5,15,13,14, 6, 0, 9,10, 4,11, 1, 2,12, 3, 7, 8);

		if (!global_swap4)	val = BITSWAP16(val,  6,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 5, 7,15, 8, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 15-6, 8-5
		if (!global_swap3)	val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,12,14,13,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 12-13-14
		if (!global_swap2)	val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11, 2, 9, 8,10, 6, 5, 4, 3, 0, 1, 7);	// 10-2-0-7
		if (!key_3b)		val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 4, 8, 7, 6, 5, 9, 1, 2, 3, 0);	// 9-4, 3-1

		if (!key_2a)		val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,12,13,14,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 14-12
		if (!global_swap1)	val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12, 9, 8,11,10, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 11...8
		if (!key_5a)		val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8, 4, 5, 7, 6, 3, 2, 1, 0);	// 7...4
		if (!global_swap0a)	val = BITSWAP16(val, 15,14,13,12,11,10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 0, 3, 2, 1);	// 3...0
	}

	return final_decrypt(val,key_F);
}


static int global_key1,global_key2,global_key3;

int fd1094_decode(int address,int val,UINT8 *key,int vector_fetch)
{
	if (!key) return 0;

	return decode(address,val,key,global_key1,global_key2,global_key3,vector_fetch);
}

int fd1094_set_state(UINT8 *key,int state)
{
	static int selected_state,irq_mode;

	if (!key) return 0;

	if (state == -1)
		state = selected_state;

	switch (state & 0x300)
	{
		case 0x0000:				// 0x00xx: select state xx
			selected_state = state & 0xff;
			break;

		case FD1094_STATE_RESET:	// 0x01xx: select state xx and exit irq mode
			selected_state = state & 0xff;
			irq_mode = 0;
			break;

		case FD1094_STATE_IRQ:		// 0x02xx: enter irq mode
			irq_mode = 1;
			break;

		case FD1094_STATE_RTE:		// 0x03xx: exit irq mode
			irq_mode = 0;
			break;
	}

	if (irq_mode)
		state = key[0];
	else
		state = selected_state;

	global_key1 = key[1];
	global_key2 = key[2];
	global_key3 = key[3];

	if (state & 0x0001)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x04;	// global_xor1
		global_key2 ^= 0x80;	// key_1a invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x80;	// key_2a invert
	}
	if (state & 0x0002)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x01;	// global_swap2
		global_key2 ^= 0x10;	// key_7a invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x01;	// key_4b invert
	}
	if (state & 0x0004)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x80;	// key_0b invert
		global_key2 ^= 0x40;	// key_6b invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x04;	// global_swap4
	}
	if (state & 0x0008)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x20;	// global_xor0
		global_key2 ^= 0x02;	// key_6a invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x20;	// key_5a invert
	}
	if (state & 0x0010)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x02;	// key_0c invert
		global_key1 ^= 0x40;	// key_5b invert
		global_key2 ^= 0x08;	// key_4a invert
	}
	if (state & 0x0020)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x08;	// key_1b invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x08;	// key_3b invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x10;	// global_swap1
	}
	if (state & 0x0040)
	{
		global_key1 ^= 0x10;	// key_2b invert
		global_key2 ^= 0x20;	// global_swap0a
		global_key2 ^= 0x04;	// global_swap0b
	}
	if (state & 0x0080)
	{
		global_key2 ^= 0x01;	// key_3a invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x02;	// key_0a invert
		global_key3 ^= 0x40;	// global_swap3
	}
	return (state & 0xff) | (irq_mode ? FD1094_STATE_IRQ : FD1094_STATE_RESET);
}


#ifdef MAME_DEBUG

/*

// Possible: global=12A8F8E5 seed=0AD691 pc=1882
// Possible: global=12AAF8E5 seed=0AD691 pc=1882
// Possible: global=82A8F8EC seed=24921C pc=1882
// Possible: global=82AAF8EC seed=24921C pc=1882
// Possible: global=92A8F8EC seed=3D5C17 pc=1882
// Possible: global=92AAF8EC seed=3D5C17 pc=1882
static const fd1094_constraint bullet_constraints[] =
{
    // main entry point
    { 0x001882, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x4ff8, 0xffff },    // lea     $0.w,a7
    { 0x001884, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x0000, 0xffff },
    { 0x001886, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x46fc, 0xffff },    // move    #$2700,sr
    { 0x001888, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x2700, 0xffff },
    { 0x00188a, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x0c80, 0xffff },    // cmpi.l  #$00xxffff,d0
    { 0x00188c, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x0000, 0xff00 },
    { 0x00188e, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0xffff, 0xffff },

    // IRQ4 entry point
    { 0x000418, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x48e7, 0xffff },    // movem.l d0-d7/a0-a6,-(a7)
    { 0x00041a, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0xfffe, 0xffff },

    // IRQ4 exit points
    { 0x000612, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4cdf, 0xffff },    // movem.l (a7)+,d0-d7/a0-a6
    { 0x000614, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x7fff, 0xffff },
    { 0x000616, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4e73, 0xffff },    // rte
    { 0 }
};

// Possible: global=FCAFF9F9 seed=177AC6 pc=0400
static const fd1094_constraint altbeaj1_constraints[] =
{
    // main entry point
    { 0x000400, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x6000, 0xffff },    // bra     $40e
    { 0x000402, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x000c, 0xffff },
    { 0x00040e, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x4ff8, 0xffff },    // lea     $ff00.w,a7
    { 0x000410, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0xff00, 0xffff },
    { 0x000412, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x46fc, 0xffff },    // move    #$2700,sr
    { 0x000414, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x2700, 0xffff },
    { 0x000416, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x0c80, 0xffff },    // cmpi.l  #$00xxffff,d0
    { 0x000418, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0x0000, 0xff00 },
    { 0x00041a, FD1094_STATE_RESET | 0x00, 0xffff, 0xffff },

    // IRQ4 entry point
    { 0x000404, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x6000, 0xffff },    // bra     $2ac4
    { 0x000406, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x26be, 0xffff },
    { 0x002ac4, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x48e7, 0xffff },    // movem.l d0-d7/a0-a6,-(a7)
    { 0x002ac6, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0xfffe, 0xffff },

    // IRQ4 exit points
    { 0x002ca4, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4cdf, 0xffff },    // movem.l (a7)+,d0-d7/a0-a6
    { 0x002ca6, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x7fff, 0xffff },
    { 0x002ca8, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4e73, 0xffff },    // rte
    { 0x002cc4, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x3f3c, 0xffff },    // move    #$2300,-(a7)
    { 0x002cc6, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x2300, 0xffff },
    { 0x002cc8, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4e73, 0xffff },    // rte

    // other IRQ entry points
    { 0x000408, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x6000, 0xffff },    // bra     $40c
    { 0x00040a, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x0002, 0xffff },
    { 0x00040c, FD1094_STATE_IRQ   | 0x00, 0x4e73, 0xffff },    // rte

    { 0 }
};

*/

#endif
